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ABSTRACT 
In 2010, the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) established the Commercial 
Crew Program (CCP) in order to provide human 
access to the International Space Station and low 
Earth orbit via the commercial (non-governmental) 
sector.  A particular challenge to NASA has been how 
to determine that the Commercial Provider’s 
transportation system complies with programmatic 
safety requirements.  The process used in this 
determination is the Safety Technical Review Board 
which reviews and approves provider submitted 
hazard reports.  One significant product of the review 
is a set of hazard control verifications.  In past NASA 
programs, 100% of these safety critical verifications 
were typically confirmed by NASA.  The traditional 
Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) model does 
not support the nature of the CCP.  To that end, 
NASA S&MA is implementing a Risk Based 
Assurance process to determine which hazard control 
verifications require NASA authentication.  
Additionally, a Shared Assurance Model is also being 
developed to efficiently use the available resources to 
execute the verifications. 
1. HISTORY OF THE COMMERICAL CREW 
PROGRAM 
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) established the Commercial Crew Program 
(CCP) in March 2010 to facilitate the development of 
a United States commercial crew space transportation 
capability with the goal of achieving safe, reliable, 
and cost effective access to and from low Earth orbit 
and the International Space Station (ISS).  The CCP 
has and continues to fulfill this objective through 
multiple procurements and acquisitions in which 
commercial companies develop elements, 
subsystems, and systems in support of an integrated 
commercial crew transportation system [1].   
CCP is currently administrating and executing two 
Commercial Crew Transportation Capability 
(CCtCap) contracts awarded to The Boeing Company 
and Space Exploration Technologies Corporation or 
SpaceX.  These contracts will grant NASA 
certification to each of the Commercial Provider’s 
Crew Transportation System (CTS) when compliance 
to NASA requirements is demonstrated.  It also grants 
each of the Commercial Provider post certification 
missions to bring NASA crew to the International 
Space Station (ISS).  Independent from and 
supporting the CCP are the three NASA Technical 
Authorities (TA); Engineering, Health and Human 
Performance, and Safety and Mission Assurance.  
Each of the TAs are responsible for agency level 
requirements and are responsible for ensuring NASA 
Programs comply with the applicable requirements.  
In addition to the TAs, the ISS Program 
independently verifies the CCP Commercial 
Providers comply with the visiting vehicle 
requirements for the ISS.   
The CCP has provided NASA the opportunity for a 
transformation in how to assure requirement 
compliance.  The transformation started with the first 
phase, Space Act Agreements, which allowed NASA 
to provide feedback on each of the Commercial 
Providers’ CTS designs while NASA was refining the 
CTS requirements.  This included obtaining feedback 
from the Commercial Providers on the CTS 
requirements during development.  Then, once the 
CTS requirements were baselined, the second phase 
of contracts allotted NASA the ability to provide 
feedback on the compliance to the NASA CTS 
requirements. The next section on the history of 
mission assurance continues to describe how NASA 
transformed its methods of compliance.  
2. DEVELOPMENT OF PROGRAMMATIC 
MISSION ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS 
HISTORY 
NASA’s mission assurance program developed 
throughout the human spaceflight programs, learning 
from past experiences.  After the Apollo 1 accident, 
separate safety and reliability offices within NASA 
were formed and Congress formed an independent 
safety organization called the Aerospace Safety 
Advisory Panel (ASAP) tasked to provide an 
independent review of policies and procedures that 
contribute to risk in the areas of operations, 
management, and systems [2]. With the Rogers 
Commission’s recommendations from the Challenger 
accident, NASA created the Office of Safety, 
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Reliability, and Quality Assurance responsible for 
safety-related policy; however, it was not until the 
Columbia Accident Investigation Board’s 
recommendation that it became an independent 
technical authority [2].  
In the development of the firm-fixed price CCtCap 
contract, the CCP was unwavering in discovering a 
new way of assuring contract compliance for the 
development work and services provided.  The 
inspection clause, a deviation to the FAR Inspection 
of Services, allows inspection of both the services and 
the research and development work performed.  In 
addition, this new direction also included a limited 
amount of data requirements deliverable (DRD) 
documents that necessitated the delivery to and 
approval by NASA.  Therefore, to allow access to the 
data used in performance of the contract and to 
continue to cultivate the partnerships with the 
Commercial Providers, a special Government Insight 
clause was developed with a complementary DRD, 
Insight Implementation Plan.  This Government 
Insight clause allows the Government to assure 
compliance to requirements through insight while the 
DRD allows the Commercial Provider to prescribe 
how NASA would have access to the data used in 
support of the CCtCap contract. 
In addition, NASA contracts are required by the 
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 46, 
Quality Assurance¸ and NASA FAR Supplement 
(NFS) Part 1846, Quality Assurance, to ensure that 
the contractor conforms to the contract requirements.  
NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) document 
8735.2, Management of Government Quality 
Assurance Functions for NASA Contracts, was 
developed to implement quality assurance functions 
defined by these regulations.  This document, 
depending on the criticality and complexity of the 
acquisition items, defines how NASA will determine 
its quality assurance functions, including product 
assurance actions (PAAs). These PAAs, or 
Government inspections, are selected based on risk 
factors that include criticality, complexity, maturity, 
supplier past performance, and personnel safety 
considerations.  Also, PAAs were placed at the last 
opportunity for inspection in the assembly and 
integration of the space transportation system.  These 
Government inspections are not a substitute for and 
do not relieve the Commercial Provider of its 
responsibility to perform quality inspections; these 
Government inspections are to ensure the final 
product is as promised by the Commercial Provider.  
Programs are required to assign a PAA for every 
product, processing, and/or performance attribute 
where a noncompliance could result in loss of human 
life; these are considered safety-critical [3].  
During the Space Shuttle Program, NASA had PAAs, 
also called Government Mandatory Inspection Points 
(GMIPs), based on the failure modes and effects 
analyses and critical items lists for each of the shuttle 
system elements.  Post-Challenger, there were 
approximately 44,000 GMIPs per flow at Kennedy 
Space Center [4], which were reduced to 
approximately 10,000 GMIPs by the end of the Space 
Shuttle Program.  The performance of these GMIPs 
required the contractor to stop, inform, and wait for 
NASA quality assurance personnel to witness or 
verify the compliance to the requirements, which 
increased the ground processing timeline of the Space 
Shuttle elements.  With the Space Shuttle GMIPs, the 
quality assurance program was performed mostly 
through direct oversight of the contractor.       
With the move to the commercial environment, the 
CCP had to find a way of ensuring compliance 
without performing 100% inspection into the 
Commercial Providers’ organizations, while still 
complying with NPR 8735.2 requirements.  In 2013, 
the NPR was revised by the Office of Safety and 
Mission Assurance, permitting programs new ways 
of determining PAAs, including allowing an 
exemption of safety-critical PAAs based on either 
statistical process controls or a formally documented 
risk analysis [3]. The second exemption, a formally 
documented risk analysis, is how the CCP determined 
to proceed.  The exemption allows the CCP to use a 
documented technical risk analysis based on many 
factors including hazard analysis controls/mitigations 
to determine and assign PAAs. The Government 
Insight clause is how NASA prescribed the use of a 
RBA for determining the PAAs. The following 
section describes the CCP RBA Process. 
  
3. RISK BASED ANALYSIS (RBA) PROCESS 
OVERVIEW 
 
Figure 1. Commercial Crew Program Risk Based Analysis Process 
The Safety and Mission Assurance Office supporting 
the CCP developed the CCP RBA process in Figure 
1 by using Safety Technical Review Board (STRB) 
approved catastrophic hazard reports.  The STRB 
process is described in the previously mentioned 
paper, “The Evolution of the NASA Commercial 
Crew Program (CCP) Safety Process [1].” It was 
determined that catastrophic hazard reports would be 
beneficial in the process of identifying safety-critical 
attributes as they address hazards that, if not 
mitigated, results in loss of human life.  The RBA 
team includes Engineering, program representatives, 
safety, and quality personnel, most of whom 
supported the STRB process.  The RBA team reviews 
each catastrophic cause/control/verification set 
within the hazard report to determine the risk posed if 
it is not properly implemented.  After the RBA team 
determines the risk of each cause/control/verification 
set, than based on the risk posed, it is determined 
whether a PAA(s) is assigned. Unlike the Space 
Shuttle Product Assurance Actions, the Commercial 
Provider does not have to wait on the Government to 
perform its inspection; however, the Commercial 
Provider is required to provide the Government with 
enough notice that the activity affected by the PAA is 
going to take place within a period of time.  The RBA 
process consists of three phases: Triage, Scorecard(s), 
and Product Assurance. However, the most important 
part of the RBA process is that it is an iterative 
process.  Once a risk profile is determined, it is re-
evaluated after a time to determine if the risk has been 
abated, stayed constant, or has increased. If the risk 
has been abated, the PAA will be retired. If the risk is 
constant or increased, the PAA(s) may be changed.  
Each of these phases is defined further in the 
following sections. 
3.1 Triage Phase 
Upon receipt of the approved catastrophic hazard 
report, it goes through a Triage. This is a quick sorting 
of the control/verification sets associated with each 
catastrophic cause within the Commercial Provider’s 
hazard report.  The first two criteria the RBA team 
takes into account for each cause is an associated 
Program Risk and an associated risk identified by the 
Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA). The PSA 
informs CCP of potential risks to loss of crew and loss 
of mission. These two criteria and evaluation at the 
cause level allows the RBA team to understand where 
the CCP has identified potential risks. Next, each 
control/verification set is evaluated against four 
criteria and the likelihood of (or risk to) it not being 
properly implemented.  The RBA team gives each of 
these four criteria a quick “yes” or “no.”  These four 
criteria are:  
Complexity: whether the design and/or process 
described within the control/verification set is 
multifaceted, intricate, complicated, and/or 
difficult to perform; 
Maturity in Aerospace Industry: whether the 
design and/or process is new or relatively new to 
industry; 
Past Performance: whether the Commercial 
Provider or sub-tier supplier lacks experience in 
successfully implementing the control and/or 
verification; and  
Subject Matter Expert and/or Quality 
Engineer’s opinion: is there a high risk to 
correctly implementing the control/verification 
set. 
If the RBA team answers “no” to all six criteria, then 
the risk is determined to be low and no PAA is 
assigned.  If there is a single “yes” to any of the six 
criteria, the RBA team may provide rationale for not 
sending the cause/control/verification set into the 
Scorecard(s) phase.  However, if the RBA team 
answers “yes” to more than one of the six criteria, the 
cause/control/verification set is brought forward to 
the Scorecard(s) Phase.   
3.2 Scorecard(S) Phase 
The Scorecard(s) phase is used to further evaluate the 
risk of the cause/control/verification set against 
criteria and to calculate a total risk score.  A 
cause/control/verification set can be sent to one or 
more scorecards, depending on what is described 
within the control/verification set.  The scorecards 
are: Design, Manufacturing, and Operations.  
Design: evaluates the control/verification set 
with a focus on design, including processes and 
tools.  The criteria include configuration 
management, design maturity, design 
complexity, Commercial Provider’s past 
performance in controlling the design.   
Manufacturing: evaluates the 
control/verification set with a focus on 
manufacturing, including fabrication, assembly, 
and the associated processes.  The criteria 
include: maturity, complexity, personnel 
competency, degree of difficulty in the 
implementation of the verification, and 
Commercial Provider’s past performance or 
similar experience in manufacturing, processing, 
materials, and tooling.   
Operations: evaluates the control/verification 
set with a focus on operations, including 
integration, final assembly, and the associated 
processes.  The criteria include: maturity, 
complexity, personnel competency, degree of 
difficulty in the implementation of the 
verification, and Commercial Provider’s past 
performance or similar experience in operations 
or processing, materials, and tooling. 
The RBA team determines the risk associated with 
each of the scorecard’s criteria and a total risk score 
is calculated. For the above described criteria, the 
RBA team defines the risk based on a scale of one to 
three; with one being low and three being high.  In 
addition, each scorecard includes the hazard cause 
likelihood from the hazard report and the overall 
subject matter’s and/or quality engineer’s opinion of 
the likelihood of the control/verification set being 
properly implemented as criteria.  For the latter 
criteria, the RBA team defines the risk based on a 
scale of one to five; with one being low and five being 
high.  The likelihood is as stated in the hazard report.  
The total calculated risk score will be between zero 
and 100.  If the risk score is 60 or above, the 
cause/control/verification set is identified for 
Government surveillance.  If the risk score is below 
60, the RBA team may still determine to assign 
Government surveillance; if not, rationale is provided 
to support no Government surveillance.  The RBA 
team may also provide to the Quality Engineering 
team what activity or action the Government 
surveillance might resemble for the Product 
Assurance Phase. 
3.3 Product Assurance Phase 
After the RBA is completed on the hazard report and 
determined that Government surveillance is 
necessary for assuring implementation, the Quality 
Engineering team considers the risk score results and 
determines the appropriate PAA for each of the 
cause/control/verification sets identified.  These 
PAAs become the mandatory Government 
surveillances on the safety-critical attributes of the 
Commercial Provider’s CTS.  A 
cause/control/verification set that is identified for 
Government surveillance will be assigned a single or 
multiple PAA(s) that are developed from the 
descriptions within the hazard report.  Quality 
Engineering may choose from four types of PAAs:  
Record Review - A review and verification that 
recorded data properly evidences conformance to 
contract requirements (e.g., invoked drawings, 
specifications). Recorded data, including 
contractually required data deliverables, may 
document work performance, product attributes, 
product configuration, product performance, or 
quality assurance actions performed by each 
Commercial Provider. This also includes an 
assessment of document(s) to verify the planned 
work conforms to contract requirements [3];  
Process Witness - A physical observation of 
each Commercial Provider’s work processes or 
demonstrations (including tests) to ensure 
compliance with documented procedure(s) and 
contract requirements. This includes processes 
related to manufacturing, fabrication, assembly, 
integration, repair, maintenance, refurbishment, 
test, and inspection [3];  
Product Examination - A physical inspection, 
measurement, or test to ensure product 
conformity to prescribed technical and contract 
requirements. This method may also include 
Engineering’s independent Verification and 
Validation of an analysis, model, simulation, or 
test results 3]; and  
Process Audit - Provides assurance of general 
process health, confirmed by assessing factors 
such as, process yield, nonconformance(s), 
and/or repeatability; meaning that the process is 
clearly-defined and shows consistent adherence 
to requirements or the manufacturing of the 
product is stable (e.g., low nonconformance 
rate). Product/Process audits ultimately confirm 
that the process is capable of achieving the safety 
critical attribute(s). Process audits should also 
confirm that process drift has not occurred since 
baseline, that process changes are being 
adequately identified and assessed, and, where 
applicable, that control plans are adequately 
defined and implemented [5]. 
In the development of the PAAs, Quality Engineering 
assigns the most suitable function for performing the 
PAA and a CCP System Office the responsibility to 
ensure its execution.  Quality Engineering will also 
assign a frequency for the performance of the PAAs 
and also indicates when a re-assessment of the risk 
profile determined by the cause/control/verification 
set is performed.  The draft PAAs are then sent to the 
CCP System Office for the assignment of a point of 
contact (POC).  Based on the description of the PAA 
the POC may be from the Program, Engineering, or 
Safety and Mission Assurance, allowing for shared 
assurance.  This allows the most suitable personnel be 
assigned to execute the PAA.   
As previously stated, the iterative nature of the CCP 
RBA process is important.  The S&MA Office 
supporting CCP is responsible for ensuring that the 
RBA process continues to identify those areas 
requiring PAAs by understanding the risk profile of 
the executed PAAs and determining any risk profile 
changes from other sources, including 
nonconformance trends and audit findings.  The CCP 
is still in the process of approving Phase II hazard 
reports, but there has been a large reduction in 
Government surveillance on safety-critical attributes 
through this documented risk based analysis. 
In the long term, the S&MA Office is investigating a 
way to allow the RBA process to become a part of the 
STRB process, eliminating the duplication of 
meetings for the same resources to discuss the risk 
profiles of hazard reports.  This combining of the 
STRB and RBA process will allow for a more 
streamlined approach where the triage and scorecards 
are combined, enabling a documented risk score for 
all control/verification sets that includes a weighting 
for Program risks and Probabilistic Safety 
Assessment impacts. 
4. SHARED ASSURANCE MODEL  
The key to making the PAAs for CCP even more 
powerful is a shared assurance model.  The Shared 
Assurance model is where the most suitable person is 
allocated based on the skill and expertise which 
minimizes or eliminates organizational overlap and 
redundancy [1]. In Shared Assurance, S&MA relies on 
other organizations to provide some of the assurance 
functions that were traditionally performed by 
S&MA.   
Traditionally, NASA accepted and owned the 
hardware/software.  The Commercial Provider was 
responsible for ensuring compliance to NASA levied 
requirements of the hardware/software; however, 
NASA programs and TAs had a substantial role, not 
only in certification, but also in the assurance of flight 
safety [1].   
In the CCP business model, NASA is purchasing a 
service.  The Commercial Providers retain ownership 
of the hardware/software and are required to certify 
their CTS to NASA CTS requirements. As NASA is 
purchasing a service, its traditional role is reduced; 
however there still exists a responsibility to assure 
crew safety.   As described in the previous sections, 
the PAAs developed from the risks identified from 
catastrophic hazard reports during the CCP RBA will 
be executed by the most suitable personnel; for 
example, a design-type PAA, like a stress analysis, 
engineering would be the most suitable.  In addition, 
the CCP is sharing the resources and data from the 
ISS Program and the Launch Services Program.  The 
key aspects of Shared Assurance are using the most 
suitable persons to perform the PAA, allowing the 
elimination of overlap among the NASA Program 
and TAs without losing the ability to assure the safety 
of NASA’s crew.     
5. SUMMARY 
The Risk Based Assurance process that enables the 
CCP to use a technical analysis of risk to determine 
which hazard cause/control/verification sets require 
NASA surveillance has greatly reduced the number 
of mandatory Government surveillance points.  Initial 
runs of the RBA process confirm that this is indeed 
the case.  The RBA process in conjunction with 
shared assurance, is allowing the CCP to efficiently 
use available resources to execute the mandatory 
Government verifications and provide sufficient 
surveillance to ensure each of the Commercial 
Providers are providing the Government a safe crew 
transportation system to the ISS. 
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